Taxonomy¶
How this marketplace is organized. The unit of installation is a plugin. Every plugin declares a category in the marketplace catalog so it shows up under the right bucket in /plugin. The four buckets are deliberately orthogonal: roles are bundles that lean on domain and core plugins rather than re-implementing them.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐
ROLE bundles │ pentester · analyst · engineer · architect│
(personas) │ GRC · blue-team · SOC/SIEM · CISO · CTO │
└───────────────┬──────────────────────────-┘
│ compose
┌────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐
│ DOMAIN │ │ GENAI │ │ CORE │
│ threat-model│ │ llm-security │ │ diagramming │
│ web/mobile │ │ rag-security │ │ reporting │
│ cloud/k8s │ │ agentic-ai-sec │ │ integrations │
│ network/infra│ │ multimodal-sec │ │ knowledge base │
│ sast-sca/dfir│ │ ... │ │ ... │
└─────────────┘ └─────────────────┘ └─────────────────┘
Core (cross-cutting capabilities)¶
Reused by every role and domain. Keep these self-contained and dependency-light.
| Plugin | Purpose |
|---|---|
security-diagramming |
Attack trees, DFDs, architecture diagrams, mindmaps, infographics (Excalidraw). |
security-reporting |
Findings, pentest reports, vuln writeups, executive summaries, CVSS scoring. |
security-integrations |
Push artifacts to Jira, Confluence, Google Drive (via their MCP servers). |
security-knowledge |
Shared reference packs: MITRE ATT&CK, OWASP Top 10 / LLM Top 10, CWE, NIST, STRIDE. |
Domain (skillsets, in depth)¶
| Plugin | Covers |
|---|---|
threat-modeling |
STRIDE, PASTA, attack trees, DFDs, risk ranking. |
web-app-security |
OWASP Web Top 10, auth, injection, SSRF, access control. |
api-security |
OWASP API Top 10, authz, rate limiting, schema abuse. |
mobile-security |
OWASP MASVS/MASTG, Android/iOS, mobile threat modeling. |
network-security |
Recon, segmentation, firewall/IDS review, protocol attacks. |
cloud-security |
AWS/Azure/GCP posture, IAM, CSPM, misconfig review. |
k8s-security |
Kubernetes/CNCF, pod security, RBAC, supply chain. |
infrastructure-security |
IaC review, hardening, CIS benchmarks, secrets. |
sast-sca |
Static analysis + dependency/SCA scanning, SBOM, triage. |
secure-coding |
Python/React secure-coding enforcement: outdated/vulnerable function detection with safe alternatives, secret/credential blocking on commit+push (Claude Code hook + real git hooks), .gitignore hygiene. |
osint |
Footprinting, recon, exposure discovery, attribution. |
dfir |
Incident response, forensics, timeline, triage. |
detection-engineering |
Sigma/YARA rules, detection-as-code, threat hunting. |
threat-intelligence |
CTI lifecycle, IOC enrichment, ATT&CK mapping. |
vulnerability-management |
Prioritization, SLAs, remediation tracking. |
supply-chain-security |
SBOM, provenance, SLSA, dependency risk. |
claude-config-security |
Audit the Claude Code config itself (hooks, MCP, permissions, agents, skills, CLAUDE.md) via the agentscanner CLI. |
GenAI security (AI/LLM security)¶
Protecting AI systems from adversaries. See "AI security vs AI safety" below —
these are a different discipline from the ai-safety bucket.
| Plugin | Covers |
|---|---|
llm-security |
OWASP LLM Top 10, prompt injection, jailbreaks, output handling. |
rag-security |
Retrieval poisoning, data exfiltration, context isolation. |
agentic-ai-security |
Tool abuse, autonomy/permission boundaries, agent threat modeling. |
multimodal-security |
Image/audio/document injection and adversarial inputs. |
mlops-security |
Model supply chain, training-data integrity, model registries. |
AI safety (a distinct bucket — not security)¶
Preventing the AI system from causing harm to users, third parties, vulnerable groups, and society — even with no attacker involved.
| Plugin | Covers |
|---|---|
ai-safety |
Harm modeling, safety evals, responsible red-teaming, bias/fairness, guardrails, responsible-AI governance (NIST AI RMF / ISO 42001 / EU AI Act). |
ai-safety-engineer (role) |
Operationalizing safeguards: evals-in-CI, guardrails, monitoring, safety cases, governance. |
mlops-security (shared) |
Overlaps both — model/data integrity matters for safety and security. |
AI security vs AI safety¶
They are different disciplines and often different teams:
| AI security (GenAI bucket) | AI safety (this bucket) | |
|---|---|---|
| Threat | An attacker compromises the system | The system causes harm with no attacker needed |
| Asks | How could it be exploited? | How could it hurt people/society? |
| Examples | Prompt injection, data poisoning, model theft | Harmful content, bias, hallucination, misuse, over-reliance |
| Frameworks | OWASP LLM Top 10, MITRE ATLAS | NIST AI RMF, EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001 |
| Method anchor | threat-modeling (STRIDE) |
ai-safety:harm-modeling |
A secure model can still be unsafe, and a safe model can still be insecure — most
real AI features need both. Install genai-suite (security) and ai-safety
(safety) together for full coverage.
Role (persona bundles)¶
Each role plugin ships a primary agent persona + a handful of role-specific skills, and is designed to be installed alongside the domain/core plugins it leans on.
| Plugin | Persona | Typically pairs with |
|---|---|---|
pentester |
Offensive tester | osint, web-app-security, network-security, security-reporting |
red-team |
Adversary emulation | threat-intelligence, detection-engineering |
security-analyst |
Triage & investigation | dfir, detection-engineering, threat-intelligence |
security-engineer |
Build & harden | sast-sca, cloud-security, k8s-security |
security-architect |
Design & review | threat-modeling, security-diagramming |
grc |
Governance, risk, compliance | security-reporting, security-knowledge |
blue-team |
Defense & hardening | detection-engineering, dfir |
soc-siem |
Monitoring & response | detection-engineering, dfir |
ai-safety-engineer |
AI safety build & operate | ai-safety, security-reporting, security-diagramming |
responsible-ai-officer |
AI governance & risk-tiering | ai-safety, security-reporting, security-diagramming |
developer |
Secure-by-default coding companion | security-knowledge, sast-sca, security-architect, infrastructure-security, secure-coding |
Executive (strategic tier)¶
Persona bundles for security leadership. Same bundle mechanics as roles, but
categorized executive in the catalog to mark the strategic altitude — they
synthesize the operational plugins' outputs into strategy, risk, and communication
rather than running tools.
| Plugin | Focus | Composes |
|---|---|---|
ciso-toolkit |
Security strategy, cyber-risk quantification, board/exec decks | security-reporting, security-diagramming, threat-modeling |
cto-security |
Secure-by-design at scale, technology-risk decisions | threat-modeling, security-diagramming, security-reporting |
Bundles vs. à-la-carte¶
Every capability is a standalone plugin — install just threat-modeling and
you get only that. On top of that, bundle plugins compose capabilities via the
dependencies field so one install pulls a whole stack:
- Role bundles (e.g.
pentester) depend on the domains + shared core a role uses. - Domain suites (e.g.
genai-suite) depend on the plugins in one domain group. - Core stays shared — diagramming/reporting/integrations are never bundled away; bundles pull them in as dependencies.
Full mechanics and the planned bundle list are in BUNDLES.md.
Naming conventions¶
- Plugin names: kebab-case, descriptive, no
security-prefix unless it disambiguates a cross-cutting/core capability. - Skill names: verb-or-noun kebab-case that reads well after the namespace, e.g.
/llm-security:prompt-injection-test. - One responsibility per skill. Prefer several focused skills over one mega-skill.
See ROADMAP.md for build order and AUTHORING.md for how to add any of the above.